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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
vs. 
DE VERE COOLEY, 
Defendant and 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) Case No. 15339 
) 
Respondent. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
As generally stated by the Appellant, this case 
arises out of an attempt of the State of Utah in Garfield 
County to prosecute on a charge of failure to stop at the 
conunand of a police officer, alleging violation of Section 
41-6-169,10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and the 
ramifications of Title 76-1-401, and the following sections 
of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, pertaining to a 
single criminal episode and what the legislature meant in 
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the Title 76-1-401 and following sections. And at the same 
time the arrest was made for failing to stop the vehicle at 
the command of a police officer, defendant was also arrestee 
for having no tail lights on a boat trailer that he was 
pulling and for driving a vehicle improperly under a restrlcti 
license. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was argued before the District Court of 
Garfield County, Utah, on the 16th day of June, 1977, upon 
defendant's motion asking that the information on file be 
dismissed with prejudice, inasmuch as prosecution on same wa1_ 
barred under the provisions of Title 76-1-403, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. The motion was allowed on the 
16th of June, 1977. A written order was executed by the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, on the 27th of June, 
1977, and was filed with the Clerk of the Court on the 29th 
of June, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent desires to have the action of the 
District Court affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as set forth by the Appellant 
is correct as far as it goes, but does not completely tell the 
fact situation. In addition to those items set forth by 
Appellant, the defendant appeared before the Honorable Jess 
Pollock, Justice of the Peace of Panguitch Precinct, Garfield 
County, Utah, on the 25th day of May, 1977, and entered a 
plea of guilty to the two offenses of no tail lights on a 
boat trailer and driving under an improper or restricted 
license and was fined $25.00 and paid the fine, At the same 
hearing and before .. the same Justice of the Peace, the defen-
dant waived Preliminary ·Hearing on the item of which ·this 
appeal is concerned and was bound over to District Court. 
The information on same was dated the 26th of May, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S POINT NO. I IS PROPER, 
In the opinion of the undersigned, Point I, as stated 
by the State and the Appellant, correctly states the law, and 
this defendant and respondent has no desire to argue this 
particular point. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ACTION WAS PROPER. 
Bearing in mind that there are very few cases tha: 
interpret this statute or statutes similar to this that are 
known to the undersigned, and apparently there are more kno'.:. 
to the undersigned than there are to either the Attorney 
General or the County Attorney of Garfield County, whether 0, 
not this is an instant prosecution being in a single Court _ 
cannot be a very serious question, inasmuch as not only were 
the tickets all taken to the same Justice of the Peace, but 
that Justice of the Peace bound this item over, and that all 
action in the Justice of the Peace's Court, including paymem 
of the fine on the two misdemeanors, happened in the same 
session. While without any question the Justice of the Peaci 
does not have authority to try a Class A Misdemeanor, at the 
same time, that is the place where the prosecution was actuai. 
initiated on same. 
We often wonder what is meant by the legislature 
in some of the question, and this, of course, has the s~e 
unsolved problems of legislative pronouncement in that some· 
" (a) The off en; times we see, what does the following mean: 
are within the jurisdiction of a single court •. " (76·1· 402 (1 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.) 
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Many of us do not know what this means, and the case of ~ 
v. Krech, 252 N.W. 2d 269, does not answer this question, but 
is probably the best case to throw a light on what other 
jurisdictions have done with a similar statute. 
Probably what the legislature of the State of Utah 
meant in saying the two separate courts might be in one 
offense punishable in a City Court and another punishable in 
the State Court system. Possibly we could say the same that 
one offense was punishable in a juvenile court and one in the 
regular court system. I doubt if any of us really know 
exactly what that particular item meant, and at the same time 
the Krech case cited above, does throw some light on this 
particular situation. 
POINT III. 
THE STATUTE IS INTENDED TO AVOID MULTIPLE 
PROSECUTIONS OR PILING ON. 
There is no question that at times a defendant can 
irritate an officer to the point that several charges are 
forthcoming. Apparently that happened in this case, inasmuch 
as the first ticket was written on the charge of failing to 
stop at the command of a police officer. Apparently the 
police officer was somewhat irritated, inasmuch as at the 
same session after writing this ticket, he then on the next 
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ticket put two charges, no tail lights on a boat t 
railer ana 
driving under an improper or restricted license. In all 
probability the officer was not aware of the driving d 
un er 
the restricted license until after the defendant had stoppec 
and had exhibited a driver's license. Thereafter; they were 
all processed together. 
The Krech case cited above at 252 N. W. 2d 269, 
decided on 1 April, 19 77, is a very similar case. The def en· 
dant was driving at speeds over 80 m. p. h.; when the red lign~ 
came on, he accelerated, failed to stop for a stop sign, tur;.' 
into a dead end road and squad cars were positioned to prever,: 
further movement, then tried to run down an officer with the 
car, which was prevented only by a second officer ramming 
defendant's automobile with a squad car. As has happened in 
the instant case, in the Krech case in Minnesota, defendant 
was charged with aggravated assault, obstructing legal prom 
and various traffic offenses. Apparently, it was processed 
the same. The defendant entered a guilty plea to the mis· 
demeanor traffic offenses, and was sentenced to 60 days in 
jail, which were suspended on conditions of probation for on< 
year and various alcohol treatments. As in the instant case, 
the District Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss th< 
charges of aggravated assault and obstructing legal process 
in view of the defendant's plea of guilty to the lesser 
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offenses. The Minnesota Supreme Court took the attitude that 
where a defendant's conduct constitutes more than one offense 
under the laws of the State, he may be punished for only one 
of such offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of 
them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court suggests that if the State wishes 
to charge a defendant with more than one offense, it should 
all be done in one prosecution, stating each offense as a 
separate count. 
In the opinion of the undersigned, there is some 
difference in the statutes of the State of Utah and the 
statutes of Minnesota. However, it appears that the problem 
is the same, and the State of Minnesota has affirmed the 
District Court in the dismissals as we have in the instant 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
That the action of the District Judge of the Sixth 
Judicial District in and for Garfield County in dismissing 
the information with prejudice should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney fpr Respondent 
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